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REVISITING THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT OF
1961: A CALL FOR EQUITABLE ANTITRUST
I[MMUNITY FROM SECTION ONE OF THE SHERMAN
ACT FOR ALL PROFESSIONAL SPORT LEAGUES
INTRODUCTION
Imagine today is Monday, a crisp fall day. After eight hours of
work, two hours of commuting, and thirty minutes of waiting for the
pizza delivery person, you grab a two-liter of cola, a bowl of potato
chips, and a hot pizza. So what is missing? For millions of American
households the answer is Monday Night Football' on television.
2
Viewers throw popcorn at the television set because their favorite
five-million-dollar-a-year wide receiver dropped the football in the
end zone. Meanwhile, they do not realize how much money is actu-
ally at stake in broadcasting the sporting event and how essential it is
for the survival of the National Football League (NFL). 3 As one court
noted, "[Sporting events] provide[ ] a magnificent spectacle for televi-
sion programs and television provides an excellent outlet and market
for [sporting events]. They both can use and indeed need each
other."'4 In today's business of sports, revenue from televising games,
for example on Monday Night Football, is a key piece of the revenue
pie for any sport league and its teams.5 Professional sport leagues,
1. Monday Night Football is a weekly primetime broadcast of a National Football League
(NFL) game on the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) that dates back to 1970. See gen-
erally William A. Sutton, Marketing Principles Applied to Sport Management, in PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE OF SPORT MANAGEMENT 47 (Lisa Pike Masteralexis et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter
SPORT MANAGEMENT].
2. The top-rated network sports telecast for the third quarter of 2003 (July 1-September 30)
was the September 8 Monday Night Football game featuring the Tampa Bay Buccaneers and the
Philadelphia Eagles that approximately 14.14 million households watched. See Nielsen Third-
Quarter TV Report, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESS J.: BY THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29,
2003, at 83. Monday Night Football is "the longest-running hit show on network television."
Tim Ashwell, Sport Broadcasting, in SPORT MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 380, 386.
3. The NFL is the premium professional football league. For more information, see NFL,
Home Page, at http://www.nfl.com (last visited Oct. 16, 2004).
4. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
5. Major League Baseball (MLB) has national television rights deals, which generate on aver-
age a total of $558.5 million dollars per year, that could have been easily used to pay for the
sixty-five free agent player signings by various MLB teams during the 2002-2003 season, which
totaled approximately $206.6 million. See Recent Television Rights Deals, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTSBUSINESS J.: BY THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29, 2003, at 84 [hereinafter Television Rights];
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such as the NFL, pool all or some of their individual teams' broadcast-
ing rights into contracts with national television networks. 6 In 1962,
the NFL, consisting of fourteen teams, received approximately
$325,000 per team in television revenues. 7 In 1998, the NFL was able
to command approximately $75 million in guaranteed revenue for
each of its thirty teams8 by pooling broadcasting rights into national
packages. 9 Currently, Major League Baseball (MLB) spreads revenue
generated from its $851 million, five-year deal with Entertainment
Sports and Programming Network (ESPN), 10 and its $2.5 billion, five-
year contract with Fox Broadcasting Company, equally among its
member teams.1"
In order for professional sport leagues, such as the NFL and MLB,
to spread large television revenues among their teams, the prevailing
view of federal antitrust law, that anticompetitive restraints on trade
and monopolies are undesirable in the U.S. free market system, must
be confronted. 12 Individual teams give up the right to compete
against each other for some or all of the revenue generated from their
television broadcasting rights in order for the league to sell national
2002-2003 MLB Free Agent Signings, STREET & SMrTH'S SPORTSBUSINESS J.: BY THE NUMBERS
2004, Dec. 29, 2003, at 111.
6. PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
PROBLEMS 629 (2d ed. 1998).
7. See id.; see also NFL, NFL History, at http://www.nfl.com/history/standings/1962 (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2004). In 1962, the NFL was not the only professional football league receiving
revenue from television broadcasting deals. See generally AFL v. NFL, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir.
1963). The American Football League (AFL), which consisted of eight teams, competed with
the NFL to be the premier provider of professional football in the United States. See id. at 126.
8. NFL, supra note 3.
9. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 629. The NFL's national packages include deals with
ABC, Fox, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), and Entertainment and Sports Programming
Network (ESPN). See Television Rights, supra note 5. For seasons played from 1998-2005, the
NFL will receive $17.6 billion from its television rights deals. See id. On average, the NFL
receives $2.2 billion per year. Id. The NFL's current television rights deals double its 1994-1997
deals with ABC, Fox, National Broadcasting Company (NBC), ESPN, and Turner Network Tele-
vision (TNT), which totaled approximately $1.1 billion per year. Id.
10. ESPN was founded in 1979. See ESPN, ABC Sports Customer Marketing and Sales,
at http://www. espnabcsportscms. com/adsales/portfolio/index. jsp? content = general- portfolio-
expanded.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). ESPN was founded as a cable network dedicated to
twenty-four hours of sports-related coverage, and the company has expanded to include several
television networks, such as ESPN2, ESPN Classic, and ESPN Plus; a fully integrated website
(www.espn.go.com) that includes live Internet radio and video highlights, and a biweekly publi-
cation, ESPN The Magazine. See id.
11. Television Rights, supra note 5, at 84. MLB's contract with ESPN runs from 2000 to 2005
and has an average annual value of $141.8 million for the league. See id. MLB's contract with
Fox runs from 2001 to 2006 and has an average annual value of $416.7 million for the league. See
id.
12. See, e.g., Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
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broadcasting rights as a whole.' 3 The relationship between antitrust
and the pooling of broadcast rights by professional sport leagues will
be examined in this Comment. This area of antitrust law needs clarity
and equity. As it stands now, only the four major professional sport
leagues' 4 enjoy a limited immunity from antitrust litigation when sell-
ing horizontally pooled broadcasting rights to air channels. 15 This lim-
ited immunity is unfair to other professional sport leagues. The
immunity for the horizontal pooling of television broadcast rights
should cover all available professional sport leagues and all television
broadcasting opportunities to promote competition among profes-
sional sport leagues. Federal antitrust legislation can still be applied
effectively in order to regulate the broadcasting of professional sports
and to maintain an open, competitive broadcasting rights market.
Part II of this Comment explores the history of antitrust issues in
sport broadcasting, including federal antitrust statutes and the Sports
Broadcasting Act (SBA). 16 Next, Part III demonstrates why equitable
antitrust immunity for all professional sport leagues is necessary.
17
Part III focuses on the expansion of the SBA's protection from section
one liability for all professional sport leagues' pooling of broadcasting
rights and the legitimate business justifications for section one immu-
nity.18 Part III also evaluates how federal antitrust legislation could
still be applied to broadcasting of professional sport leagues.19 Part
IV explores the impact that such a change in federal antitrust law will
have on the sports industry and sports broadcasting. 20 This Comment
concludes that the expansion of federal antitrust immunity to all pro-
fessional sport leagues promotes competition for broadcasting rights
among leagues and provides an equal playing field for all professional
sport leagues.21
II. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the modern antitrust problems with profes-
sional sport broadcasting, the evolution of the legal issues surrounding
the industry must be explored. This section explains the applicable
13. See generally, e.g., WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6.
14. Football, basketball, baseball, and ice hockey are exempt from section one of the Sherman
Act. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
15. See id. §§ 1291-1295.
16. See infra notes 22-161 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 162-297 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 168-270 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 271-297 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 298-314 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
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federal antitrust statutes, explores the meaning and ramifications of
the SBA, and concludes with the modern developments that have
placed sport broadcasting in the antitrust limelight.
A. Applicable Federal Antitrust Statutes-Sections One and Two
of the Sherman Act
In 1890, Congress, relying on its constitutional power to regulate
interstate commerce,22 passed the first set of federal antitrust regula-
tions in the United States.23 "Congress 'wanted to go to the utmost
extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly
agreements,"' 24 and thus "mandat[ed] for this nation a competitive
business economy. '2 5 Antitrust laws are not meant to regulate the
size, growth, or power of a particular business, but only meant to regu-
late unreasonable anticompetitive methods that may be used to obtain
or maintain market power.26 Of all the federal antitrust legislation
enacted, 27 two provisions, section one and section two of the Sherman
Act of 1890 (Sherman Act), most impact the sport broadcasting
industry.28
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
24. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194 (1974) (quoting United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944)).
25. Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1973). A competitive business
economy "yield[s] the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality, and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment
conducive to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions." N. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
26. United States v. N.Y. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 642 (E.D. I11. 1946),
affd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
27. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-37 (2000) (including the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of
1914).
28. In order to bring an antitrust suit under the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show standing
in accordance with Article III of the Constitution. See Chi. Prof't Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961
F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 1992). Every plaintiff in an antitrust suit must show an injury to consum-
ers in terms of reduction in output or higher prices. Id. at 670 (citing Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA
Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990)); see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104
(1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit summarized standing factors for private citizens, includ-
ing "(1) the nature of the plaintiffs alleged injury; that is, whether it was the type the antitrust
laws were intended to forestall; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) the speculative measure of
the harm; (4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) the complexity in apportioning damages."
Am. Ad Mgrnt., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. Co., 190 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). Section four of the
Clayton Act authorizes suits for damages by private parties. Clayton Act of 1914 § 4, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (2000). The Supreme Court has held that "indirect purchasers" do not have standing to
bring antitrust suits against manufacturers of the product. Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, Inc., 188 F.
Supp. 2d 1177, 1199 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 728-29, 737-47
(1997)).
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Section one of the Sherman Act states that "[e]very contract, com-
bination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is hereby declared to be illegal."'2 9 Section one focuses on con-
certed activity that unreasonably restrains interstate commerce.
30
Claims under section one are analyzed either under the per se ap-
proach or the "rule of reason" approach. 3' But only the rule of reason
approach is used in sport-related cases because of the unique nature
of sports.32 Courts have rejected applying the per se approach to the
sports world. 33
A per se violation of section one occurs when a business "practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to
restrict competition and decrease output. '34 In other words, some re-
straints are "presumed to have no benefit to competition in the indus-
try."'35 With a per se violation, violators will not be given the
opportunity to explain their particular market context. 36 If applying
the rule of reason, professional sport leagues are given the opportu-
nity to balance anticompetitive injuries with procompetitive bene-
fits. 37 Leagues can provide business justifications for what might
29. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
30. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 (1984) (needing a "plurality
of actors.., for a § 1 conspiracy"); Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365
F.2d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 1966) (stating that "[i]t is fundamental that at least two independent
business entities are required for violation of [s]ection [one], while one alone is sufficient under
[s]ection [two]"); Aspen Title & Escrow, Inc. v. Jeld-Wen, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1477, 1484 (D. Or.
1987) (stating that "[t]he essence of a [slection [one] action is concerted rather than unilateral
action").
31. The dual approach to section one claims can be traced back to an 1898 opinion by Judge
Taft, in which restraints on trade were placed into two categories: "contracts having no purpose
but to restrain competition" and "ancillary" restraints. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 Fed. 271, 299, 291 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 174 U.S. 211 (1899). The "rule of reason" was
approved by the Supreme Court in 1911. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66
(1911).
32. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98-102 (1984).
33. See id. at 103-04. The Supreme Court did not apply the per se analysis to college football.
See id. The Court ruled that if it did, sport leagues would always be in per se violation of hori-
zontal restraints on competition. Id. at 100-01. See also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. ABC, 747
F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984) (criticizing the use of the rule of reason in price fixing and group boycott
charges and suggesting that the per se analysis would be better).
34. Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
35. See generally Lisa Pike Masteralexis, Antitrust and Labor Law: Professional Sport Appli-
cation, in LAW FOR RECREATION AND SPORT MANAGERS 664 (Doyice J. Cotton et al. eds., 2d ed.
2001). The per se test is generally applied in two situations: (1) when courts seek to avoid a long
inquiry into an industry's business operations; and (2) when courts examine "agreements be-
tween traditional business competitors." Id.
36. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 19-20.
37. See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695-96 (1978).
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appear to be an unreasonable restraint of trade. 38 To pass the rule of
reason test, generally three elements must be shown.39 First, there
must be a conspiracy or an agreement among two or more persons. 40
Second, the agreement or conspiracy must be intended to restrain or
harm competition.4 Finally, it must be proven that competition was
actually restrained or harmed.42 Although sport leagues enjoy some
judicial latitude by having the rule of reason applied, they often vio-
late section one 43 because the application of either the per se analysis
or rule of reason "does not change the ultimate focus of [the] in-
quiry" 44-the "competitive significance of the restraint. ' '45
Section two of the Sherman Act focuses on monopolies and their
power to impact interstate trade.46 The purpose of the monopoly pro-
vision is not to completely prohibit monopoly power, but to prohibit a
person from maintaining or attempting to gain monopoly power in
any part of commerce through the use of illegal trade practices. 47 As
one court stated, "Hence the existence of power 'to exclude competi-
tion when it is desired to do so' is itself a violation of [section two],
provided it is coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that
power." 48
In order to prove a violation of section two, a person must have
monopoly power in a defined product and geographic market.49 Also,
the person must have misused that power by using illegal means to
acquire or maintain the monopoly. 50 Monopolies gained or main-
38. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).




43. See generally, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd.
P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992); USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
44. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984).
45. Id. (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692).
46. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 102-03 (1910). Section two states:
"Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty." Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2000). For purposes of federal antitrust legislation, "person" is defined "to include corporations
and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of
any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country." Id. § 7.
47. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1948).
48. Id. at 107 (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946)).
49. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d
1335, 1358 (2d Cir. 1988).
50. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
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tained "from growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident" are not illegal. 5'
Section two was intended to supplement section one. 52 Although
they may overlap in terms of the person's objectives, violations of sec-
tion one and section two are legally distinct offenses53 and the sections
can be violated independently of each other.54 But it is understood
that monopoly power is a "species of restraint of trade; '55 therefore,
the "same kind of predatory practices may show violations of [both
section one and section two]." 56 One of the main differences between
section one and section two violations is the requirement of two or
more actors for a section one violation. 57
B. Before 1961: The Early Fight Against Section One
of the Sherman Act
As sporting events became more popular so did the broadcasting of
such events. Until the 1950s, the right to broadcast games generally
belonged to individual teams.58 Thus, sport leagues did not have to
worry about section one of the Sherman Act when their games were
broadcast. As the sport broadcasting industry developed, however,
professional sport leagues realized that pooling their teams' individual
rights into packages to sell to national television networks would in-
crease total league revenue and allow revenue sharing among their
teams.59 The NFL helped launch the concept of pooling broadcasting
51. Id. at 571.
52. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1910). "[T]he [second] section serves to
establish that it was intended to supplement the first and to make sure that by no possible guise
could the public policy embodied in the [first] section be frustrated or evaded." Id.
53. Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 788.
54. Id.; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 226 (1940). Conviction under
both section one and section two for the same activity does not violate the Fifth Amendment's
Double Jeopardy Clause. See Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 787-88.
55. White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600, 602 n.3 (8th Cir. 1942)
(quoting Socony-Vacuum Oil, 310 U.S. at 226 n.59).
56. Md. & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 463 (1960). The penalties
for violating section one and section two can be severe. See Clayton Act of 1914 §§ 4, 4A, 4C,
16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a, 15c, 26 (2000). Violation of section one or section two is a felony
punishable by fines up to $350,000 for a non-corporation entity and up to $10,000,000 for a
corporation, or by imprisonment for up to three years. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(2000). A private person and the U.S. Government may sue for treble damages and a State's
Attorney General may bring a civil action on behalf of a natural person for treble damages. Id.
§§ 15, 15a, 15c. Private persons can also seek injunctive relief. Id. § 26.
57. Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1972); Six Twenty-Nine
Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 484 (5th Cir. 1966).
58. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 549.
59. Id. at 550.
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rights, and as a reward for its forethinking, the NFL was named as the
defendant in the important sport broadcasting lawsuit, United States v.
NFL (NFL 1).60
In 1953, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) sought an
injunction against the NFL. 61 The NFL was concerned with new tele-
vision technology that would allow any game to be telecasted in any
part of the country, which threatened the territorial exclusivity princi-
ples included in the NFL Constitution.62 Therefore, the NFL sought
"to limit the breadth of broadcasts of games played by any one
team."' 63 The DOJ challenged the NFL's restriction on live broadcasts
of out-of-market games into the "home territory" of another team on
a day that the home team was playing (either home or away). 64 Ap-
plying the rule of reason analysis under section one, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the
NFL was "truly a unique business enterprise" and was allowed to put
reasonable restraints on its teams. 65 Nevertheless, the court held that
the NFL's prohibition on individual teams from selling broadcasting
rights to competing television networks when the home team was
playing in another market was an unreasonable restraint on trade.66
But the court did uphold the NFL's restriction on broadcasting out-of-
market games into a local market on days when the home team was
playing.67 The court found that the restriction had a reasonable busi-
ness justification because the purpose was not to restrain competi-
tion.68 Attendance at home team games could be affected when there
were competing games on television and, in the 1950s, this was a big
concern because gate receipts were the largest source of revenue. 69
60. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
61. Id. This was the first and only suit ever brought by the United States Department of
Justice against any professional sport league. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 550.
62. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 549.
63. Id. at 550. The NFL was concerned that more successful teams would be able to broadcast
games into other teams' markets, which would impact gate revenues in the other markets. Id. at
549-50; NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 325.
64. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 321. In Article X of the NFL's bylaws, a team's broadcasting "home
territory" was a seventy-five mile radius from a team's city. See id.
65. Id. at 326.
66. Id. at 326-27.
67. Id. at 325.
68. Id.
69. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 326. The court noted that "[t]he greatest part of the defendant clubs'
income is derived from the sale of tickets to games." Id. at 325. The court did not consider the
financial value of such contracts. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 554.
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In 1961, NFL I became a problem when the NFL decided to sell
pooled broadcasting rights to Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS). 70
Fearing that the 1953 decision would have a negative effect on its abil-
ity to pool broadcasting rights, the NFL once again found itself in
court.7 1 In the 1961 case, United States v. NFL (NFL II),72 the NFL
petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania to construe NFL I to allow its contract with CBS.73 Be-
cause the CBS-NFL contract prohibited teams from selling broadcast-
ing rights for their own games to any other television network, the
court found that the NFL violated the NFL I decision. 74 The NFL's
restriction on its member teams, which eliminated all competition for
the sale of broadcasting rights, was an unreasonable restraint of
trade. 75
C. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961
In response to NFL I and NFL H, the NFL lobbied Congress to
give them a special exemption from section one of the Sherman Act. 76
In granting the special interest legislation, Congress stated in section
1291 of the SBA that
[t]he antitrust laws, as defined in [s]ection [o]ne of the [Sherman]
Act[,J ... shall not apply to any joint agreement.., by which any
league of clubs participating in professional football, baseball, bas-
ketball, or hockey contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any
part of the rights of such league's member clubs in the sponsored
telecasting of the games . . . engaged in or conducted by such
clubs. 7 7
Legislative history of the SBA indicates that section 1291 should be
read narrowly. 78 First, at the time of its enactment, the purpose of the
SBA was to provide the NFL with the means to broadcast a team's
70. The NFL contract with CBS was in response to the AFL's league-wide contract with ABC.
WEILER & ROBERTs, supra note 6, at 554. The AFL, now the American Football Conference
(AFC) within the NFL, was a competitor of the NFL during the 1960s. Id.
71. See generally United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 446. The terms of the CBS-NFL contract included a two-year exclusive relationship
between the NFL and CBS. Id. The $4,650,000 from the contract was to be shared equally
among the league and the fourteen teams in existence at that time. Id.
74. Id. at 447.
75. NFL, 196 F. Supp. at 447.
76. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (2000).
77. Id. § 1291.
78. See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9896, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), aff'd, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999).
1245
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road games into its home territory, 79 thereby allowing the NFL to by-
pass the adverse 1961 federal district court decision in NFL H.80 Sec-
ond, the United States House of Representatives made it clear that
the "[SBA] does not apply to closed circuit or subscription televi-
sion."'81 Third, even the NFL Commissioner, Pete Rozelle,82 acknowl-
edged to the House Antitrust Subcommittee that the statute would
only apply to free television.83 In addition to the legislative history
that indicates a narrow exemption from section one of the Sherman
Act, the Supreme Court has held that exemptions from antitrust regu-
lations should be construed narrowly.84
The scope of the SBA is also narrowed by the statutory language
itself in that it only exempts the pooled broadcasting rights of four
professional sports from section one of the Sherman Act. 85 Further-
more, sections 1292-1294 of the SBA narrows the protection even
more.86 Section 1294 states that the SBA
shall [not] be deemed to change, determine, or otherwise affect the
applicability or nonapplicability of the antitrust laws to any act, con-
tract, agreement, rule, course of conduct, or other activity by, be-
tween, or among persons engaging in, conducting, or participating
in the organized professional team sports of football, baseball, bas-
ketball, or hockey.87
79. USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1347 (2d Cit. 1988) (citing S. REP. No. 87-1087, at 1 (1961),
reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3042. 3042).
80. Id.
81. Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *10-11 (quoting Telecasting of Professional Sports
Contests: Hearing Before the Antitrust Committee of the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R.
8757, 87th Cong. 4 (Sept. 13, 1961)). A closed circuit television (CCTV) system consists of a
finite, predetermined group of televisions that receive live or recorded signals over a closed loop.
See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, Closed Circuit Television, at http://
www.museum.tv/archives/etv/ClhtmlC/closedcircui/closedcircui.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005).
Technically, cable television is CCTV; however, the term CCTV is often associated with security
and surveillance systems and "in house" television channels. Id.
82. Pete Rozelle was the commissioner of the NFL from 1960-1989. See Pro Football Hall of
Fame, Pete Rozelle, at http://www.profootballhof.com/hof/member.jsp?player-id=185 (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2004).
83. Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *1 (citing Telecasting of Professional Sports Con-
tests: Hearing Before the Antitrust Committee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R.
8757, 87th Cong. 36 (Aug. 28, 1961)). While testifying before the United States House of Repre-
sentatives, NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle was asked: "You understand, do you not, Mr. Ro-
zelle, that this Bill covers only the free telecasting of professional sports contests, and does not
cover pay T.V.?" Id. Pete Rozelle replied: "[A]bsolutely." Id.
84. See, e.g., Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 126 (1982).
85. Only football, basketball, baseball, and ice hockey are protected from litigation in cases
involving pooled broadcasting rights. There is no protection for other professional sports or
amateur sports. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1294 (2000).
86. See id. §§ 1292-1294.
87. Id. § 1294.
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Section 1292 also states that "black outs" of games in a "home terri-
tory" are only allowed when the home team is playing a home game
that particular day.8s Furthermore, section 1293 puts more restric-
tions on professional football leagues when broadcasting games on
Friday nights and Saturday.
8 9
D. After the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961-Trying to Clarify the
SBA and Section One of the Sherman Act
with Modern Developments
At the time Congress passed the SBA, air channels, for all intents
and purposes, were the only broadcast option available for leagues to
sell broadcast rights.90 Thus, any television contract involving the four
professional sport leagues fell under the "sponsored telecasting of the
games" language of section 1291.91 But as broadcasting technology
has evolved, so have the antitrust issues affecting the sport broadcast-
ing industry.92 The narrow interpretation of the SBA is also problem-
atic in light of new broadcasting developments, such as the
proliferation of cable and satellite television.93 Along with profes-
sional sport leagues not protected by the SBA, the four major profes-
sional leagues were again faced with antitrust challenges under section
one.
94
The first antitrust challenges testing the section one exemption in
the SBA dealt with air channels. 95 Only three issues have surfaced
when broadcasting over air channels. First, a federal district court
found the antitrust exemption applies to the pooling of broadcasting
88. Id. § 1292. This is consistent with the basis for the decision in United States v. NFL that
game receipts and attendance were "reasonable" reasons for limiting telecasts when a team is
playing at home. See United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 325-26 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1293. This provision was enacted to protect "intercollegiate and interscholas-
tic football" from professional football broadcasting games after six o'clock on Friday nights and
all day Saturday from the second Friday in September to the second Saturday in December on
stations within seventy-five miles of any college or high school football contest. Id. Essentially,
professional football is banned from playing games on Friday nights and Saturdays, unless they
are willing to forego broadcasting revenue from those games. Id.
90. For a picture of a 1961 primetime television programming guide, which lists ABC, NBC,
and CBS as the only options available for viewers, see Television History-The First 75 Years,
1960-2000 TV Guide (USA), at http://www.tvhistory.tv/1961_TVPrograms.jpg (last visited Oct.
15, 2004).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
92. See generally, e.g., Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir.
1999); Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992); Kingray, Inc. v. NBA,
188 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
93. See cases cited supra note 92.
94. See cases cited supra note 92.
95. See, e.g., Blaich v. NFL, 212 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). For the purposes of this Com-
ment, "air channels" means free, over-the-air, local broadcasts.
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rights of playoff and championship games along with regular season
games. 96 Second, "black outs" in "home territories" apply to televi-
sion stations whose signals penetrate the "home territory." 97 Third,
the SBA is not only limited to pooled broadcasting packages that sell
every contest the league produces, but also allows leagues to sell pack-
ages for a certain number of games. 98 Thus, the league may sell a set
number of games for national television and allow teams the right to
sell their broadcasting rights on an individual basis to local television
stations. 99
The meaning of "sponsored telecasting of the games" in section
1291 of the SBA, however, has been narrowly construed in cases not
involving air channels. 100 In a series of court battles, all entitled Chi-
cago Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, l0' WGN, a super-
station102 in Chicago, Illinois, challenged the policy of the National
Basketball Association (NBA) to pool national broadcasting rights
and the effects of this policy on the Chicago Bulls's ability to sell its
broadcasting rights to WGN. 10 3 The cases revolved around a restric-
tion on superstations from broadcasting the same night as Turner Net-
work Television (TNT), a cable network that purchased a pooled
broadcasting game package from the NBA.1°4 Although the litigation
ended in a settlement between the parties, the courts still had an op-
portunity to consider whether the SBA's exemption applied to cable
broadcasting. 0 5 The district court found, and the United States Court
96. Id. at 319 (examining whether section 1292's "black out" provision could be used to black-
out a championship game in a "home territory").
97. WTWV v. NFL, 678 F.2d 142, 145-46 (11th Cir. 1982) (noting that even if stations are
physically located outside the defined "home territory," a game can still be "blacked out" when
its signal penetrates the "home territory").
98. See Chi. Profl Sports, 961 F.2d at 670.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., Shaw, 172 F.3d at 301-02; Chi. Profl Sports, 961 F.2d at 670; Kingray, 188 F.
Supp. 2d at 1183.
101. Chi. Profl Sports, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'g 874 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. I11. 1995); Chi.
Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992), affg 754 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. I11.
1991); Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 808 F. Supp. 646 (N.D. Il1. 1992).
102. For the purpose of this Comment, "superstations" are local television stations (air chan-
nels in their home area) televised nationally over cable programming or satellite television.
103. See generally Chi. Prof l Sports, 754 F. Supp. 1336.
104. See id.
105. Chi. Profl Sports, 95 F.3d 593, rev'g 874 F. Supp. 844 (looking at the single entity defense
to section one of the Sherman Act); Chi. Prof l Sports, 961 F.2d 667, affg 754 F. Supp. 1336
(holding that the NBA's reduction of the number of games individual teams could sell to super-
stations was an unreasonable restraint of trade); Chi. ProfI Sports, 808 F. Supp. 646 (denying the
NBA's partial summary judgment motion to the antitrust challenge of the "NBA Superstation
Same Night Rule"). At the center of all of the courthouse visits was the NBA's $180 million
contract for the 1991-92 season with NBC and TNT. See WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at
558.
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of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed, that cable stations are not
"sponsored" broadcasts and limited SBA's application to "free com-
mercial television" and not "subscription television. ' 10 6 The Seventh
Circuit stated that "[w]hat the industry obtained, the courts enforce;
what it did not obtain from the legislature-even if similar to some-
thing within that exception-a court should not bestow." 10 7 Applying
the rule of reason, the court held that the NBA must allow individual
teams to sell their rights to games that were not included in the na-
tional package; therefore, the NBA could not limit the number of
games teams are allowed to telecast on superstations, although broad-
casting on a superstation might "compete" with the national broad-
casting package. 10 8
Like the analysis used in cable broadcasting, section 1291's "spon-
sored telecasting" provision has been interpreted narrowly to limit the
SBA's exemption to air channels in cases involving satellite compa-
nies.109 Satellite companies provide a broadcast alternative to cable
programming by selling television programming through the use of
satellites, satellite dishes, and receivers.110 As of August 2003, one in
five American households with televisions received their program-
ming through satellite television."' Leagues sell broadcasting rights
for all of their season's games to a satellite television company.
11 2
In Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd.,113 three private citi-
zens filed a class action suit against the NFL claiming that the NFL's
satellite programming package of all league games broadcast under
the pooled national television contracts1 4 violated section one.
1 15
The plaintiffs claimed that "NFL Sunday Ticket" reduced competition
106. Chi. ProJl Sports, 808 F. Supp. at 649-50.
107. Chi. Profl Sports, 961 F.2d at 671.
108. Id. at 667.
109. See generally, e.g., Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999); Kingray, Inc.
v. NBA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
110. See Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, Satellite Services Overview,
at http://www.sbca.com/mediaguide/satservices.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
111. Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, U.S. DBS Satellite Television
Subscribers Tops 20 Million Mark (Aug. 20, 2003), at http://www.sbca.com/press/08200 3 .htm.
112. E.g., "NFL Sunday Ticket," "NBA League Pass," and "NHL Center Ice." See DirecTV,
NFL Sunday Ticket, at http://www.directvsports.com/Subscriptions/NFLSundayTicket (last vis-
ited Oct. 15, 2004); NBA, NBA League Pass, at http://www.nba.com/nba-tv/league-pass.html
(last visited Feb. 4, 2005); NHL, NHL Center Ice, at http://nhl.com/nhlhq/centerice/index.html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2004).
113. No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172 F.3d
299 (3d Cir. 1999).
114. The NFL pools all of its games into national broadcasting packages. Ashwell, supra note




and artificially raised prices because it restricted the options available
for non-network broadcasts of NFL games.' 16 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania' 17 rejected the
NFL's argument that the SBA's exemption applied because the NFL
retained partial rights to games broadcasted on "sponsored" televi-
sion, and held that a satellite television package was only one way to
sell those retained rights in "sponsored telecasts." 118 In an interlocu-
tory review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the SBA did not protect the NFL's sale of games for satellite
programming packages. 119 The district court, in denying the NFL's
motion to dismiss, held that the plaintiffs could have a claim under
federal antitrust laws.120 The case was later settled without resolving
the antitrust challenges at issue. 121
In Kingray, Inc. v. NBA,1 22 however, a court examined the question
left open in Shaw-whether the practice of selling "out-of-market"
game packages to satellite companies was a violation of antitrust
laws. 123 The plaintiffs, private individuals and commercial establish-
ments, brought a class action against the NBA and DirecTV124 over
the satellite programming package of "NBA League Pass. ' 125 The
plaintiffs alleged four theories under section one of the Sherman Act,
all of which were rejected by the court. 26 First, the plaintiffs argued
that the contract between the NBA and DirecTV was a vertical price-
fixing scheme. 127 Because the NBA did not advise DirecTV on the
115. See generally Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *1. In order to receive the NFL's
satellite-packaged games, a household must own a satellite dish, subscribe to a satellite provider,
and pay a flat fee of $139 for the entire season. Id. at *2-3.
116. Id. at *14-15.
117. The same court found that the pooling of broadcasting rights by the NFL violated section
one. See United States v. NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961); United States v. NFL, 116 F.
Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
118. Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *7.
119. Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 172 F.3d 299, 303 (3d Cir. 1999).
120. Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *14.
121. The parties looked to settle this dispute, but the settlement agreement was not approved
by the court. See Schwartz v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., 157 F. Supp. 2d 561, 564 (E.D.
Pa. 2001).
122. 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
123. Id.; see Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *2.
124. DirecTV is a satellite subscription service. See Satellite Broadcasting and Communica-
tions Association, supra note 110.
125. Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1188 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
126. Id.
127. Id. Vertical price fixing "occurs when a supplier attempts to fix the prices charged by
those who resell its products." Id. For the difference between vertical and horizontal restraints,
see Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) ("Restraints
imposed by agreement between competitors have traditionally been denominated as horizontal
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amount to charge for the service, but only stipulated a wholesale price
to be paid by DirecTV to the NBA, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California found that the plaintiffs failed
to show vertical price fixing by the defendants.128 Second, the plain-
tiffs argued that the NBA and DirecTV vertically conspired to limit
the output of live broadcasts. 129 Given that "black outs" only oc-
curred when the game was available on another channel, the court
found that the defendants did not limit the number of games normally
available on television.130 Third, the plaintiffs alleged that the NBA
and DirecTV unlawfully restrained trade by entering into an exclusive
distributorship of "NBA League Pass."' 131 The court found that trade
was not restrained because an exclusive agreement is not a per se anti-
trust violation.1 32 DirecTV was not the exclusive provider of "NBA
League Pass," 133 and the agreement between DirecTV and the NBA
did not intend to harm competition. 134 An exclusive agreement is not
a violation unless it is "intended to or actually does harm competition
in the relevant market."1 35 Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the de-
fendants horizontally conspired to fix prices and divide the market.
1 36
The court found that the NBA and DirecTV were not competitors;
therefore, they could not horizontally conspire.1 37 The court also
noted that the plaintiffs did not allege a tying agreement; 138 therefore,
the court left the issue open.
139
Antitrust litigation involving pooled broadcasting rights has not
been limited to the four professional sports referred to in the SBA.
140
College football, like the other professional sport leagues, does not
enjoy the limited protection of the SBA.141 NCAA v. Board of Re-
restraints, and those imposed by agreement between firms at different levels of distribution as
vertical restraints.").
128. See Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1191.
129. See id. at 1188.
130. Id. at 1195.
131. Id. at 1188.
132. Per se analysis is generally not applied to sport cases because of the nature of the busi-
ness. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984).
133. "NBA League Pass" was also available to cable customers through iN Demand, a pay-
per-view system. See Kingray, 188 F. Supp. at 1198.
134. Id. at 1197-98.
135. Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 735 (9th Cir. 1987).
136. Kingray, 188 F. Supp. at 1188.
137. Id. at 1198.
138. Tying agreements occur when one party conditions the sale of his product upon the
purchase of another product. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 549,
605 (1953).
139. Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
140. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 486 U.S. 85 (1984).
141. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
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gents of the University of Oklahoma142 played a key role in shaping the
broadcasting of college sports.143 In that case, the University of
Oklahoma and the University of Georgia challenged television broad-
casting restrictions for Division I football' 44 imposed by the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). a45 The restrictions at issue
included the number of football games each member university could
televise during a particular season, the number of football games
made available to the public, and the ban on universities contracting
with broadcasting outlets on their own.146 The United States Supreme
Court ruled that the NCAA's rules were unreasonable horizontal re-
straints that resulted in higher prices and lower output of televised
games. 147
E. Sport Broadcasting and Section Two of the Sherman Act
Section two of the Sherman Act also plays an important role in
sport broadcasting antitrust litigation. Under the SBA, section 1291
specifically states that its antitrust exemption only applies to section
one of the Sherman Act. 148 Therefore, section two applies equally to
all sport leagues. 149 In USFL v. NFL, 150 the United States Football
League (USFL) filed suit against the NFL claiming that the NFL mo-
nopolized the television market and that its broadcasting contracts
were unreasonable restraints of trade.' 5 ' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the jury's decision that the
NFL willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power in professional
football within the United States and that the USFL was injured by
the NFL's monopoly power.152 But the jury only awarded the USFL
142. 486 U.S. 85 (1984).
143. See generally id.
144. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 85.
145. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is a non-profit association that
acts as the governing body for college athletics at more than 1,250 schools, conferences, and
organizations. See NCAA, Membership, at http://www2.ncaa.org/about-ncaa/membership (last
visited Oct. 15, 2004).
146. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 90-94.
147. Id. at 104, 107.
148. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
149. Cf. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (exempting professional football, basket-
ball, baseball, and ice hockey from section one claims).
150. 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988), affg 634 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The United States
Football League (USFL) competed with the NFL for three seasons during the 1980s. Id. at 1340.
151. See id. at 1341. At the time of the case, the NFL had contracts with three major televi-
sion networks. See id.
152. See id.
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one dollar in damages (trebled to three dollars). 153 The jury declined
to find that the NFL's television contracts restrained trade, and that
the contracts interfered with the USFL's lack of a television con-
tract. 154 The NFL did not deny the USFL access to the "essential fa-
cility" of network television because
television contracts [are] not unreasonable restraints of trade[, ...
the NFL did not control access to the three major television net-
works[,] . . .and . .. the NFL did not interfere either with the
USFL's ability to obtain a fall television contract or with its spring
television contracts.1 55
Although the NFL had a monopoly in professional football, the NFL
did not monopolize the television market or attempt to do So.
1 5 6
F. Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
It is important to note that professional baseball enjoys a unique
status in federal antitrust law.157 In 1922, baseball won a major Su-
preme Court victory in Federal Baseball Club v. National League,
158
when the Court ruled that professional baseball was immune from an-
titrust legislation. 159 In 1972, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the immunity might be "unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical," but the
Court refused to overrule the exemption, stating that it is up to Con-
gress to fix the inconsistency.160 In 1998, Congress finally confronted
and removed baseball's antitrust exemption for issues dealing with
"employment of major league baseball players.' 16'
153. See id. A private person may "recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
154. See USFL, 842 F.2d at 1341.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See generally Roger I. Abrams, The Curt Flood Act: Before the Flood: The History of
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption, 9 MARO. SPORTS L.J. 307 (1999).
158. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
159. Id. Congress included baseball as an exempt sport in the Sports Broadcasting Act (SBA)
although it already enjoyed blanket antitrust immunity. This hints that Congress did not com-
pletely agree with the judicially created immunity for baseball. See Sports Broadcasting Act of
1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
160. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972). The scope of the exemption has been chal-
lenged on several occasions. See, e.g., Piazza v. MLB, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
161. Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2000). See generally J. Philip Calabrese, Recent
Legislation: Antitrust and Baseball, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 531 (1999); Joshua P. Jones, Note, A
Congressional Swing and Miss: The Curt Flood Act, Player Control, and the National Pastime, 33
GA. L. REV. 639 (1999).
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III. ANALYSIS
A professional sport league should have the right to horizontally
pool its individual teams' rights into a television broadcasting pack-
age. Furthermore, the SBA should be expanded to cover all forms of
television broadcasting mediums. Leagues' legitimate business inter-
ests justify the expansion of the SBA's immunity from section one of
the Sherman Act to all professional sport leagues.
The current state of law regarding the horizontal pooling of broad-
casting rights for professional sport leagues is confusing and difficult
to apply. Currently, only certain leagues enjoy immunity in particular
broadcasting mediums. 162 However, all professional sport leagues op-
erate in essentially the same manner, 163 and leagues should be free to
compete effectively with each other for television contracts regardless
of which sport they govern. When certain sports are given protected
status while others are not, disparity is created and anticompetitive
situations are allowed to flourish without judicial restraint.1 64
Expansion of the SBA does not mean professional sport leagues
will be completely immune from antitrust liability. Section one could
still be applied to the actual contracts between professional sport
leagues and broadcasting networks to prevent vertical restraints on
trade. 165 Also, section two of the Sherman Act would still be present
as a source of liability for professional sport leagues. 166 Leagues can
still be liable for illegally maintaining a monopoly or illegally attempt-
ing to monopolize television broadcasting opportunities.1 67
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1291.
163. Professional sport leagues seek to have all of their teams financially viable and competi-
tive on the playing field regardless of whether the league is structured as a single entity or teams
are individually owned. See Fraser v. MLS, L.L.C., 284 F.3d 47, 53 (1st Cir. 2002); Myron C.
Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a Single Entity Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1982).
164. See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 893, 923-24 (1999) (stating that every team has an opportunity to
compete for a championship because of league rules such as revenue sharing, salary restrictions,
and the player draft system); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (ac-
knowledging that "[i]f all the teams should compete as hard as they can in a business way, the
stronger teams would be likely to drive the weaker ones into financial failure"); Grauer, supra
note 163, at 24 (suggesting that "one of the major causes of the failure of the All-America Con-
ference, a league that competed with the NFL in the 1940's, was the near-total domination of the
Conference by the Cleveland Browns,,).
165. See, e.g., Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
166. See Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
167. See id.
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A. Sport Broadcasting Under Section One of the Sherman Act
Antitrust legislation has always focused on the effects that restraints
of trade have on the free market and consumers. 168 Not all restraints
of trade are "unreasonable" and not all restraints negatively affect the
free market.' 69 Thus, section one of the Sherman Act allows for rea-
sonable and procompetitive restraints, and cases involving horizontal
pooling of broadcasting rights are just that.170 One of the main inten-
tions of the SBA was to give consumers more opportunities to view
sporting events.171 Expanding immunity to all professional sport
leagues that wish to horizontally pool their individual teams' televi-
sion broadcasting rights will increase competition on and off the field.
Even recent court decisions recognize that professional sport leagues'
practice of pooling broadcasting rights does not harm consumers.
172
On several occasions, courts have acknowledged that the sports busi-
ness is different from any other economic venture.' 73 Professional
sport leagues have legitimate business justifications for wanting to
control individual teams' broadcasting rights.
1. Expansion of the Sports Broadcasting Act's Immunity from
Section One Liability
A broader understanding is needed under the SBA for all profes-
sional sport leagues that decide to horizontally pool their individual
teams' broadcasting rights. All television broadcasting opportunities,
such as cable, pay-per-view, and satellite, should be made available,
168. See Lee-Moore Oil Co. v. Union Oil Co., 441 F. Supp. 730, 735-36 (M.D.N.C. 1977)
("The antitrust laws were designed to prevent restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions ... which tend to restrict production, raise prices, or otherwise control
the market place to the detriment of the purchaser or consumers of goods and services.").
169. For a discussion on reasonable restraints of trade on employment in terms of state anti-
trust laws, see Jeb Boatman, Note, Contract Law: As Clear as Mud: The Demise of the Covenant
Not to Compete in Oklahoma, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 491, 499 (2002). See generally Peter Nealis,
Note, Per Se Legality: A New Standard in Antitrust Adjudication Under the Rule of Reason, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 347 (2000).
170. See Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 ("The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such [that it] merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competi-
tion or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.").
171. See Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable Net-
works, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 469 (1990). One of the purposes of the SBA was to allow the NFL to
package games in order to ensure that a team's territory would receive broadcasts of its road
games. Id.
172. See, e.g., Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9896, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999); Kingray, Inc. v.
NBA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002). Consumers claimed injuries from horizontal and
vertical price fixing, output limitation, and exclusive dealing due to league-held contracts with
television broadcasting outlets. See, e.g., id.
173. See generally, e.g., United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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and all professional sport leagues should be able to explore those op-
portunities without fear of liability under section one of the Sherman
Act.
Expansion of section 1291's immunity for the four major profes-
sional sports of baseball, basketball, football, and ice hockey beyond
"sponsored" telecasts would not be enough. 174 The anticompetitive
effect would be much greater than the SBA's narrow interpretation,
and it would not even the playing field for the other professional sport
leagues. 175 Such leagues would have to deal with section one of the
Sherman Act while the four monopolistically minded professional
leagues176 would enjoy even greater protection for their business deci-
sions. Struggling leagues like Major League Soccer (MLS), 77 the
Women's United Soccer Association (WUSA), 78 and professional mi-
nor leagues would still be potentially liable for holding a national net-
work television deal. Although not a professional sport league, the
NCAA has faced such liability. 179 Because of the adverse decision in
Board of Regents, the NCAA stepped out of the broadcast contracting
business, except for some championship games. 180 Leagues that com-
pete with the four professional leagues still cannot pool any broadcast
rights, regardless of the buyer. 8 If the SBA exemption is expanded
to include all professional sport leagues, it would promote competi-
tion among all of the professional sport leagues. It is harder for the
other professional sport leagues to compete with the four major pro-
174. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
175. See USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
176. See, e.g., id.
177. The MLS tried to immunize itself from all section one liability by structuring as a "single
entity." See Fraser v. MLS, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130, 131-32 (D. Mass. 2000), affd, 284 F.3d 47
(1st Cir. 2002). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit strongly sug-
gested that the MLS's business structure was not a "single entity," but avoided the issue by
focusing on the lack of a relevant market. See Fraser, 284 F.3d at 53 (reviewing an antitrust
challenge to the MLS's player reserve system).
178. In September 2003, the Women's United Soccer Association (WUSA) suspended its op-
erations indefinitely. See WUSA, About WUSA, at http://wusa.com/about (last visited April 20,
2005). It had received "insufficient revenue from ... core areas of the business" and had not
achieved the sponsorship levels needed to attain its plan to break even by its fifth season. See
WUSA, WUSA Suspends Operations (Sept. 15, 2003), at http://www.mysoccer.com/wusa3/
wusa09l5.phtml (quoting John Hendricks, Chairman of the WUSA Board of Governors); see
Jennifer Lee, Thin Ratings, Lack of Sponsors Trip WUSA, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTsBUSINESS
J., Sept. 22-28, 2003, at 4. In December 2004, the Women's Soccer Initiative, Inc. was formed to
assist the re-launch of the league in 2005 and beyond. See WUSA, Women's Soccer Initiative,
Inc. (WSII) to Steer WUSA Re-launch (Dec. 7, 2004), at http://wusa.com/news/?id=1723.
179. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
180. See NCAA, Television: A Brief History of NCAA Television Coverage, at http://www.
ncaa.org/about/tv.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
181. This is so because the SBA only exempts the four major professional sport leagues. See
Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
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fessional sport leagues when they are not allowed to pool broadcast
rights without fearing antitrust liability.
The United States Olympic Committee (USOC), although not a
professional sport league, is run much in the same way as professional
sport leagues. t 82 The USOC is comprised of National Governing
Bodies (NGBs) overseeing each Olympic sport. 183 Each NGB can be
considered an individual "team" for the "USOC league." Presently in
the United States, one network and its affiliates, including cable net-
works, broadcast the Olympic Games under the direction of the
USOC.t 84 If the "USOC league" was not able to pool its "teams" into
one national broadcasting package, then some "teams" would be able
to command more and better network time while other "teams"
would receive little or no media coverage. 18 5 As such, should net-
works be allowed to bid on certain Olympic events and not others? In
the spirit of the Olympic movement and its promotion of amateur
sport, the answer should be "of course not." It would destroy the
competitive balance needed for sports to survive. 186 Like the USOC,
all professional sport leagues should be allowed to promote all of their
teams through the use of broadcasting packages without fear of fed-
eral antitrust liability.
There is no doubt that the SBA was special interest legislation
sought by the NFL.187 Legislative history clearly indicated that the
SBA should only apply to free television, not subscription televi-
182. The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) oversees the Olympic movement within
the United States. See James M. Gladden & Mireia Lizandra, International Sport, in SPORT
MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 208, 223. The U.S. government chartered the USOC in the
Amateur Sports Act of 1978. See Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.
§ 220501-220512 (2000).
183. See Gladden & Lizandra, supra note 182, at 225-26.
184. Each set of Olympic Games is played every four years with the Summer Games and the
Winter Games operating on a staggered two-year plan. See International Olympic Committee,
Olympic Games, at http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/index-uk.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2004);
International Olympic Committee, Organisation, at http://www.olympic.orgluk/organisation/
index.uk.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2005). For example, NBC bought the broadcasting rights for
2004 Olympic Summer Games in Athens, Greece that provided twenty-four hour coverage by
televising events on NBC, MSNBC, and CNBC. Sports Illustrated, NBC Plans Extensive
Olympic Coverage, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.comolympics/news/ 2 0 0 3/02/05/
olympics-tv/ (posted on Feb. 5, 2003).
185. Certain Olympic events draw more viewers than others and help boost television viewer-
ship. See generally Richard Sandomir, Ratings Win Gold for NBC, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2004, at
D3.
186. Competitive balance is the concept that all teams can compete evenly on and off the
field. See Grauer, supra note 163, at 24.
187. See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9896, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999); USFL v. NFL, 842
F.2d 1335, 1347 (2d Cir. 1988).
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sion.188 But Congress could not have been aware of the technological
advances that have produced the vast opportunities for pooling televi-
sion broadcasting rights that exist today. 89 Presently, there is little
difference between a professional sport league selling its pooled
broadcasting rights either to the National Broadcasting Company
(NBC), a free air channel, or to ESPN-a basic cable network. 190 For
example, one in five television-watching households in the United
States has a subscription to satellite programming, which includes
ESPN as a standard channel. 191 By contrast, in the 1960s there were
only three national networks. 192 And although there are many more
broadcasting opportunities available to professional sport leagues and
more viewing options for consumers, in cases such as Chicago Profes-
sional Sports and Shaw, the courts have narrowly construed "spon-
sored" to cover only "free commercial television.' '193
In Chicago Professional Sports, one of the main concerns was an
individual team's right to compete for broadcasting revenue with
other teams in the same league. 194 But the court only alluded to an
important aspect of the relationship between a league and its individ-
ual teams.195 When a team owner decides to purchase a team, he or
she agrees to follow the league's rules and to keep the league's greater
welfare in mind. 196 In exchange, an owner receives the benefits that
accompany having exclusive rights within a "home territory" for his or
her team. 197 A professional sports team owner enters into a league
188. See Bradley W. Crandall, Note, The DirecTV NFL Sunday Ticket: An Economic Plea for
Antitrust Law Immunity, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 287, 309 (2001).
189. Although legislative records do indicate that Congress was aware of the existence of pay
and cable television, the proliferation of cable networks and programming could not have been
anticipated by Congress. See Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *10-11.
190. The expanded opportunities for television broadcasting are discussed infra Part III.A.2.b.
191. Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, supra note 111.
192. See Television History-The First 75 Years, supra note 90.
193. Chi. Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673-76 (7th Cir. 1992), affg 754 F.
Supp. 1336 (N.D. I11. 1991); Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999).
194. See Chi. ProfI Sports, 961 F.2d at 669. The Chicago Bulls were able to demand higher
prices for their broadcasts because at the time they were the most popular and winningest team
in the NBA. See id.
195. The court noted that
[t]he persons denominated owners of teams may not own them in an economic sense.
Many of their actions are subject to review by the league's board, so that the "owners"
may be no more than financier-managers of the league's branch offices. How much
cooperation at the league level is beneficial is an interesting question in economics as
well as law.
Id. at 672-73.
196. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 549-50.
197. Id.
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aware of his or her unique business relationship with the league and
the other teams, and that the nature of the business might justify cer-
tain restraints on both management and players.198
2. Nature of the Business and Legitimate Business Justifications for
Protection from Section One
The nature of the sports business is unique. Certain business justifi-
cations, such as the nature of the industry and competitive balance,
may be reasonable in the sports context but not in any other business
situation. 199 The need to balance the teams competitively in a profes-
sional sport league, the expanded opportunities for television broad-
casting, the existence of natural monopolies, and some indifference by
courts are considered below.
a. Competitive Balance
Competitive balance is the concept that all teams can compete
evenly on and off the field. 200 The pooling of individual teams' broad-
casting rights is one way of keeping a competitive balance among
teams. Rightfully so, competitive balance is the main reason leagues
cite when justifying alleged restraints of trade. 20 1
Although federal antitrust laws are designed for "the protection of
competition, not competitors,' '20 2 the nature of the professional sport
league business is different from other economic and business ven-
tures in the United States. 20 3 Even the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania acknowledged the unique na-
ture of sports before ruling against the NFL in NFL 1.204 The court
explained that "[i]f all the teams should compete as hard as they can
in a business way, the stronger teams would be likely to drive the
198. There have been many justifiable restraints put on management, such as revenue-sharing
and luxury taxes, and players, such as salary caps and drafts, since the advent of the professional
sports world. For an overview of sports law, see Timothy Davis, What Is Sports Law?, 11 MARO.
SPORTS L.J. 211 (2001). For a discussion on growing issues, see Steve Underwood & Christopher
Whitson, Symposium Transcript: Emerging Issues in Sports Law, 4 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAc. 120
(2002).
199. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football
Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172
F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999); Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
200. See Grauer, supra note 163, at 24.
201. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
202. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
203. See United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr.,
A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 893, 923-24
(1999).
204. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 323.
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weaker ones into financial failure. '2 05 Teams seek to beat each other
on the playing field, but they are completely dependent upon one an-
other for their survival off the playing field. 206 A professional sport
league depends on each of its member teams to add value in terms of
financial contribution and entertainment value.20 7 Teams need other
teams to play.20 8 For example, the NFL sells all regular season and
playoff games at a national level instead of letting individual teams
market their own rights. 20 9 Leagues need to have the ability to pool
resources to promote competitive balance and to insure survival of all
its teams.210
As stated in the introduction, the horizontal pooling of broadcasting
rights for professional sport leagues and their subsequent contracts
with television networks has become a major piece of total revenue
for professional sport leagues.211 If teams are left to their own de-
vices, a great disparity can result.212 Because market size greatly in-
fluences the price of the broadcasting deals, a team, such as the
MLB's New York Yankees could demand $57 million per year when a
team like the MLB's Montreal Expos could only demand $536,000 per
year.213
Although the NCAA is not a professional sport league, it is a prime
example of how competitive balance can be thrown off when the hori-
zontal pooling of broadcasting rights is not allowed. 214 For example,
in Division I football,2 15 the NCAA has no role in broadcasting
205. Id. at 323-24.
206. See generally Grauer, supra note 163.
207. See, e.g., id. at 24 (suggesting that "one of the major causes of the failure of the All-
America Conference, a league that competed with the NFL in the 1940's, was the near-total
domination of the Conference by the Cleveland Browns").
208. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 323.
209. The NFL only allows its member teams to sell the broadcasting rights locally for
preseason games. See generally NFL Preseason: Kicking It Up, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTsBusl-
NESS J.: By THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29, 2003, at 90-92.
210. See NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 323, Grauer, supra note 163; Piraino, supra note 164.
211. Id.; see also text accompanying notes 5-13.
212. This was a main concern in the NFL when it first decided to pool broadcasting rights
back in the 1950s. See Ashwell, supra note 2, at 385.
213. See MLB, News, at http://mlb.com/hearings/overview.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
The New York Yankees's monetary figure predates the development of its own network, which
launched on March 19, 2002. See YES Network, About YES Network, at http://www.yesnet
work.com/network/aboutyes.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). In 2004, the Montreal Expos
moved to Washington, D.C., and became the Washington Nationals. See Washington Nationals,
Nationals Timeline, at http://washington.nationals.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/was/history/timeline4.
jsp (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
214. See generally NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
215. For more information about the NCAA and its Divisions, see Carol A. Barr, Collegiate
Sport, in SPORT MANAGEMENT, supra note 1, at 171, 171-81.
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games, including the Bowl Championship Series (BCS). 216 In 1998,
the four most prestigious and lucrative bowl games joined with the six
biggest Division I college football conferences and the University of
Notre Dame to form the BCS. 217 This left the institutions in the other
five conferences to compete for two "at-large" bids for one of the four
bowl games. 218 The BCS, and not the NCAA, ultimately controls the
bowl game system and the annual Division I championship game.
21 9
The current situation in college football was created because the
NCAA was not allowed to maintain control over television revenue
for Division I college football due to the Supreme Court's decision in
Board of Regents.220 The Knight Foundation Commission on Intercol-
legiate Athletics,221 an organization dedicated to reform in college
athletics, reported that
[t]he television money, when parceled around, never seems to be
enough, and the benefits are never evenly distributed. The rich -
that is, the schools more in demand by network schedule-makers -
get richer, the poor go deeper into debt. Disparities have widened
to the point where many underfunded programs trying to compete
at the top level are perpetual losers, both on and off the field.
222
The NCAA has been unable to maintain competitive balance for its
member universities and colleges.
Furthermore, the Board of Regents decision forced the NCAA to
step back from overseeing the broadcasting of the other sports it gov-
erns.223 The NCAA summed up its role in television broadcasting of
college athletics by stating, "Today, the NCAA's television involve-
216. See Bowl Championship Series, Home Page, at http://www.bcsfootball.org (last visited
Mar. 17, 2005).
217. In 1998, the Atlantic Coast, Big East, Big 12, Big Ten, Pacific-10, and Southeastern Con-
ferences, and the University of Notre Dame, along with the Nokia Sugar Bowl, Tostitos Fiesta
Bowl, FedEx Orange Bowl, and Rose Bowl formed the Bowl Championship Series (BCS) for
NCAA Division I football. See Bowl Championship Series, About the BCS, at http://
www.bcsfootball.org/index.cfm?page=about (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
218. See Bowl Championship Series, supra note 217. The six BCS conferences are granted
"consideration tie-ins" with the bowl games, which essentially guarantee at least one team from
each conference will play in a BCS bowl game. Id.
219. Id.
220. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
221. The Knight Foundation was established in 1950 as an institute to promote the "furthering
[of the] ideals of service to community, to the highest standards of journalistic excellence and to
the defense of a free press." John S. & James L. Knight Foundation, Statement of Purpose, at
http://www.knightfdn.org/default.asp?story=about/purpose.asp (last visited Mar. 17, 2005). In
1989, the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation started a Commission on Intercollegiate Ath-
letics directed at reform in collegiate athletics. See Barr, supra note 215, at 170.
222. KNIGHT FOUND. COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A CALL TO ACTION:
RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION (June 2001), available at http://
www.knightfdn.org/athletics/reports/2001-report/KnightCommission200 .pdf.
223. NCAA, supra note 180.
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ment includes broadcast and cable presentations of several champion-
ship events, [sic] however, the Association generally is not involved
with any regular-season television programs. 22 4 As a result, the
NCAA lost a valuable tool to help facilitate competitive balance for
any sport it governs.
Of course, professional sport leagues have more than one mecha-
nism for controlling competitive balance, but these mechanisms oper-
ate differently than the horizontal pooling of broadcasting rights.225
Certain mechanisms, such as revenue sharing, salary restrictions, a re-
serve system, and the player draft system, give every team an opportu-
nity to compete for a championship. 226 But these mechanisms are
legally different from the pooling of the broadcasting rights. Mecha-
nisms that restrict player movement, such as reserve clauses among
teams, salary restrictions, and drafts, all fall under the labor exemp-
tion from federal antitrust laws.2 27 If the players' unions agree to
these restrictive mechanisms in a collective bargaining agreement,
they are legal.2 28 The pooling of broadcasting rights cannot be placed
in the safe harbor of a collective bargaining agreement because it does
not involve the employer-employee relationship. 22 9 Revenue sharing
occurs because there is an agreement among the team owners, as part
of either a professional sport league's constitution or bylaws.230
224. Id. Overall, the NCAA oversees the broadcasting of eighty-eight championship events.
See NCAA, Broadcasting, at http://www2.ncaa.org/media and-events/broadcasting (last visited
Jan. 19, 2005).
225. See Piraino, supra note 164, at 931-48.
226. See generally id. For cases involving professional sport leagues' reserve clauses, see
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (baseball's "reserve clause"); McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (ice hockey's reserve system); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th
Cir. 1976) (football's "Rozelle rule" limiting player mobility); Bridgeman v. NBA, 675 F. Supp.
960 (D.N.J. 1987) (basketball's draft, salary cap, and right of first refusal); Smith v. Pro-Football,
420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976) (football player draft), affd in part & rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
227. See Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6, 17 (2000) ("[L]abor of human being is not a
commodity or article of commerce."); Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996)
("[T]he implicit exemption recognizes that, to give effect to federal labor laws and policies and
to allow meaningful collective bargaining to take place, some restraints on competition imposed
through the bargaining process must be shielded from antitrust sanctions.").
228. Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691
(1965); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1965).
229. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 623 (holding that in order for the non-statutory labor exemption
to apply, "parties [of] collective bargaining agreements pertaining to mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining ... [and] the agreement [is] the product of bona fide arm's-length negotiations").
230. For example, MLB imposes a "luxury tax" on its owners that spend over a certain
amount on player salaries. See Jason B. Myers, Shaking Up the Line-Up: Generating Principles
for an Electrifying Economic Structure for Major League Baseball, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
631 (2002).
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All of these rules help professional sport leagues to competitively
balance their teams. Immunity for pooling broadcasting rights for all
professional sport leagues would not only help promote competitive
balance among member teams, but also it would help to balance com-
petition between professional sport leagues. Immunity provides equi-
table opportunities to pursue the various television-broadcasting
avenues that are now available and were not available when the SBA
was enacted.
b. Today's Expanded Broadcasting Opportunities
The understanding of what a television network is and the overall
television environment has radically changed since 1961 and the en-
actment of the SBA.231 The main purpose of the SBA was to address
the issue of professional sport leagues horizontally combining to pool
the broadcast rights of its member teams for the sale of packaged tele-
vision rights to television networks. 232 As the number of television
networks has grown, so has the opportunity for professional sport
leagues to broadcast their games. With the increase in television
broadcasting opportunities, the revenue generated from television
broadcasts has also increased.2 33 No longer are there three national
over-the-air networks with "subscription television" as a minor part of
the television landscape; today, there is an abundance of choice for
television viewers. 234 And consumers, who are the reason the anti-
trust laws were enacted, are also no longer confined to a few television
networks for viewing. The number of over-the-air networks has in-
creased since 1961 to include networks such as Fox Broadcasting
Company (Fox), 235 United Paramount Network (UPN), 236 and the
231. See, e.g., Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, supra note 111.
232. See Crandall, supra note 188, at 309.
233. See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, Cable Networks, at http://www.museum.
tvlarchives/etvlClhtmlC/cablenetwork/cablenetwork.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
234. See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9896, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Telecasting of
Professional Sports Contests: Hearing Before the Antitrust Committee of the House Committee on
the Judiciary on H.R. 8757, 87th Cong. 36 (Aug. 28, 1961)). Now, sixty cable networks are con-
sidered "basic." See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 233.
235. The Fox Broadcasting Company was founded in 1985. See The Museum of Broadcast
Communications, Fox Broadcasting Company, at http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/F/htmlF/
foxbroadcast/foxbroadcast.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005).
236. The United Paramount Network was founded in 1994 and debuted in 1995. See The
Museum of Broadcast Communications, United States: Networks, at http://www.museum.tv/
archives/etv/U/htmlU/unitedstatesn/unitedstatesn.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
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WB Television Network (WB).2 37 The concept of television networks
has expanded to include not only over-the-air channels but also "basic
cable" networks.238 No longer are professional sport leagues and their
member teams confined to compete for contracts with just over-the-
air networks. By 1994, the number of options on cable television in-
cluded up to ninety-four basic networks and twenty premium chan-
nels.239 From 1983 to 1994, weekly over-the-air networks' viewing
audience shares2" 0 dropped from sixty-nine to fifty-two, and during
the same time period basic cable networks' viewing audience shares
rose from nine to twenty-six.2 41 Because of the expansion of "televi-
sion networks" to include both over-the-air networks and cable net-
works, in today's television market, the sale of pooled broadcasting
rights includes contracts with cable networks such as ESPN,242
TNT,2 4 3 and the Fox Sports Network (FSN).244 The focus has shifted
from gaining an affiliation with an over-the-air network to gaining af-
filiations with cable networks.245 Leagues should be able to contract
with cable networks for league-wide contracts because cable television
is the equivalent to 1961's options for television programming and
outlets.2 46 Instead of the three national networks available back in
1961,247 consumers today have over 150 networks to choose from,
237. The WB Television Network was the United States's fifth over-the-air broadcast net-
work. See The WB Television Network, About The WB Television Network, at http://
thewb.com/AboutUs/Index/0,8258,,00.html (last visited Mar. 17. 2005).
238. See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 236; The Museum of Broad-
cast Communications, supra note 233.
239. See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, United States: Cable Television, at http://
www.museum.tv/archives/etv/U/htmlU/unitedstatesc/unitedstatesc.htm (last visited Mar. 17,
2005).
240. "Share is an audience measurement term that identifies the percentage of television
households with sets in use which are viewing a particular program during a given time period."
See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, Share, at http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/S/
htmlS/share/share.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004).
241. The Museum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 239.
242. See generally ESPN, supra note 10.
243. TNT broadcasts NBA games on Thursdays and also broadcasts some National Associa-
tion for Stock Car Auto Racing (NASCAR) events. See TNT, We Know Drama, at http://
www.tnt.tv/sports (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
244. Fox Sports operates several affiliates across the United States, and offers both local
sports programming and national sports programming. See FSN, Fox Sports, at http://
msn.foxsports.com/story/1636002 (last visited Mar. 17, 2005).
245. See generally NBA Television Deals, STREET & SMrrH'S SpORTsBUSINESS J.: By THE
NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29, 2003, at 88 (showing that for the 2003-2004 season seven teams did not
have any plans to broadcast games through affiliations with over-the-air local networks); NHL
Television Deals, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTsBusINESS J.: By THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29, 2003,
at 89 (showing that for the 2003-2004 season nineteen out of thirty teams had no intention to
broadcast games through a local over-the-air broadcast network affiliation).
246. See Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, supra note 111.
247. See Television History-The First 75 Years, supra note 90.
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available through cable programming and packaged satellite
television.248
Television viewers have more choices in deciding how they wish to
receive cable networks. 249 Packaged satellite television has expanded
cable programming to rural areas of the country where cable televi-
sion service is unlikely to be available. It has also given consumers
another option to consider when purchasing cable television net-
works.250 The proliferation of satellite broadcasting services has made
the broadcasting of professional sports games on cable channels even
more lucrative.251
With the advent of packaged satellite television and digital cable,
the opportunity for consumers to purchase out-of-market games has
also increased. Season packages, such as "NBA League Pass," "NFL
Sunday Ticket," and "NHL Center Ice," have provided consumers the
opportunity to purchase games they normally would not have received
on over-the-air and cable networks.2 52 As questioned in Shaw and
explained in Kingray, such packages are not anticompetitive because
they do not limit the number of games consumers would normally see
in their local markets. 253 Today, season-game packages, such as
"NBA League Pass" and "NHL Center Ice," are available through
both the major satellite television providers of DirecTV and Dish Net-
work and the digital cable subscribers through iN DEMAND.254 As
the NBA explains: "With NBA LEAGUE PASS, you will be able to
see up to [forty] out-of-market regular season games a week. Games
included in NBA LEAGUE PASS are in addition to those available
on ABC, TNT, NBA TV, ESPN, ESPN2 and your local networks
(such as a regional sports network and/or over-the-air station). 255
The NFL tells viewers, "Tune to your local FOX or CBS station to
248. See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 233.
249. See Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, supra note 111.
250. Id. Cable television service is available to ninety-five percent of all television households
in the United States. See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 239.
251. See The Museum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 233. Although referred to as
"basic cable" networks, satellite television provides a comparable channel selection with cable
services. Id.
252. Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, 172 F.3d 299, 300 (3d Cir. 1999); Kingray, Inc. v.
NBA, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
253. Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *1,
5 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999); Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, 188 F. Supp.
2d 1177, 1194 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
254. Id. "NFL Sunday Ticket" is only available on satellite television through DirecTV. See
DirecTV, supra note 112.
255. NBA, supra note 112. The National Hockey League (NHL) has a program, "NHL Center
Ice," that provides consumers with over one thousand games per season including some playoff
games. See NHL, supra note 112. The NFL's "NFL Sunday Ticket" provides the 1:00 p.m. and
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view [local] games. '256 These types of packages increase consumer
choice, rather than restrict the broadcasting market like the plaintiffs
alleged in Shaw and Kingray.257 They help the professional sport
leagues maintain competitive balance by splitting the revenues gener-
ated by such season packages among member teams.258
c. Existence of Natural Monopolies in Professional Sports
As with the unique business notion of competitive balance in the
sports industry, natural monopolies and restraints of trade also exist in
the sports industry.259 Restraints of trade on team owners and players
are placed immediately upon them when they enter into the profes-
sional sports ranks. Individual-team owners must agree to restrictions
placed in the league's Constitution and bylaws, but they are rewarded
with territorial exclusivity. 260 A team owner is allowed to maintain a
monopoly in his or her respective sport within a "home territory," un-
less they grant the league permission to allow another team to enter
into their local market. 261
When antitrust laws break up a league's ability to pool broadcast
rights, sets of "mini-monopolies" naturally form. For example, when
the Supreme Court broke up the NCAA's ability to sell its Division I
football games, the ability to sell football games went to the confer-
ences. 262 Instead of the NCAA selling their games as a package deal
and controlling the competitive balance among various colleges and
universities, conferences act as "mini-NCAAs" when selling the
broadcast rights to their games. Instead of most individual schools
competing against each other for broadcasting rights, the conferences
handle the broadcast deals. 263 These broadcast deals horizontally
4:00 p.m. (Eastern Standard Time) Sunday broadcasts on CBS and Fox to consumers. See
DirecTV, supra note 112.
256. DirecTV, supra note 112.
257. Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *4-5; Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
258. See Shaw, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9896, at *4-5; Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
259. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 103-04 (1984) (applying the rule of reason be-
cause if per se analysis was applied, sport leagues would always be in violation of horizontal
restraints); USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that the NFL was a monopoly).
260. WEILER & ROBERTS, supra note 6, at 549-50.
261. For example, in Article X of the NFL's bylaws, the broadcasting "home territory" of a
team was defined as the seventy-five mile radius from a broadcasting station of a team's city. See
United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 321 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
262. See generally NCAA, 468 U.S. 85; Ass'n of Indep. Television Stations, Inc. v. Collegiate
Football Ass'n, 637 F. Supp. 1289 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
263. For example, the Big Ten Conference sells all of its home games to ABC, ESPN, and its
affiliates. In contrast, the University of Notre Dame, which has no conference affiliation for
football, sells the rights to its home games to NBC. See Broadcast Rights to Major Sports
Properties, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTsBusINESS J.: By THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29, 2003, at 84.
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pool television broadcasting rights at a smaller level. Although one
might think that this would promote more football coverage and allow
the less influential conferences to bargain for television broadcasting
deals, the current situation in college football suggests otherwise.
2 64
Instead, BCS conferences are able to demand more money and able
to compete every year for the championship. 265 Meanwhile, lesser
conferences are excluded.2 66 When these conferences are left out of
contention for a high-profile bowl game, the product markets for their
games are weakened. 267 If the NCAA was able to pool television
broadcasting rights, the NCAA could distribute wealth more evenly
among the hundred-plus Division I schools; thus, allowing more com-




Some courts have shown judicial indifference when looking at anti-
trust issues involving professional sport leagues' pooling of broadcast-
ing rights not covered by the SBA.269 For example, although the court
in Kingray found that "NBA League Pass" was not exempt from sec-
tion one of the Sherman Act under the SBA, the court found no viola-
tion of the federal antitrust laws.270 But it is unknown whether such
judicial indifference will continue or if courts will find violations of
section one for the pooling of broadcasting rights not protected under
the SBA.
Several cases have dealt with challenges to conferences pooling broadcasting rights. See, e.g.,
Ass'n of Indep. Television Stations, 637 F. Supp. at 1309 (finding "a dangerous probability that
[College Football Association] and the Big Eight [Conference] can or will be able to control
prices and exclude competition in a relevant market"); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Am. Broad.
Cos., 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming a preliminary injunction that prohibited two univer-
sities from withholding consent to broadcast their games on CBS solely based on the universi-
ties' ABC contract that restricted crossover broadcasts).
264. For more information on how the Bowl Championship Series works and how the money
is distributed to conferences, see ABC Sports, About the BCS, at http://sports.espn.go.com/
sports/tvlistings/abcStory?page=aboutbcs (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
265. KNIGHT FOUND. COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, supra note 222.
266. See id.
267. Although antitrust laws are intended for the "protection of competition, not competi-
tors," the existence of organized sporting competitions is fundamentally tied to the existence of
competitors. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
268. For example, the University of Notre Dame has a contract with NBC for broadcasting of
all of its home football games nationally. See supra note 263.
269. See, e.g., Kingray, Inc. v. NBA, 188 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Cal. 2002).




B. Antitrust Legislation that Should Be Applied to Professional
Sport Leagues for Broadcasting
The expansion of the SBA would not affect other aspects of federal
antitrust law. Even if all professional sport leagues are allowed to
horizontally pool their television broadcasting rights without fear of
violating section one of the Sherman Act, there are two other ways
leagues could be liable for anticompetitive restraints. First, section
one could still be applied for vertical restraints placed on the broad-
casting market by a professional sport league's contract with a televi-
sion network. Second, section two, the monopoly provision, would
still be applicable to television broadcasting contracts.
1. Section One of the Sherman Act Can Still Be Applied to the
Actual Contracts for Vertical Restraints
By allowing all professional sport leagues to horizontally pool
broadcasting rights of member teams, the immunity would not pre-
clude section one from still being applied. Section one could still ap-
ply to the actual contracts with the television networks for vertical
restraints. Vertical restraints are agreements that restrict competition
on different levels of the distribution chain.271 The SBA was enacted
in response to the Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania's
1953 and 1961 decisions that the NFL could impose horizontal agree-
ments on its teams to be able to broadcast games in a national pack-
age.272 By monitoring professional sport leagues for vertical restraints
placed on the television broadcasting market, leagues would still face
consequences for unreasonably restraining trade.2 73
In Kingray, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of California found that the NBA and DirecTV did not violate
section one of the Sherman Act. 274 DirecTV could broadcast all regu-
lar season games over satellite programming because they were not
vertically restraining trade.2 75 The court found that because the NBA
did not tell DirecTV what to charge consumers for the programming,
but merely set a wholesale price and DirecTV decided the cost to con-
sumers, they did not conspire to inflate prices.2 76 If the NBA had told
271. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988).
272. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (2000); United States v.
NFL, 196 F. Supp. 445, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1961); United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa.
1953).
273. See Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); Clayton Act of 1914 §§ 4, 4A, 4C, 16
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a, 15c, 26 (2000)).
274. See generally Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 1201.
275. Id. at 1192, 1196, 1198.
276. Id. at 1191-92.
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DirecTV what to charge consumers, it would have violated section
one.
277
Therefore, vertical agreements between a sport league and a broad-
casting network or outlet could be analyzed under section one of the
Sherman Act for a conspiracy between the two entities. For example,
if the contract itself is a restraint on the network from broadcasting
any other professional sport league's sporting events, then section one
could be applied to find a tying agreement.
The purpose of the SBA was to allow leagues to pool teams' broad-
casting rights horizontally, but not to restrain the trade of other
leagues. 278 A vertical restraint does not help competitive balance
across individual teams like the horizontal pooling of television broad-
casting rights. Allowing liability for vertical restraints would not dis-
rupt the original intent of the SBA.
2. Section Two of the Sherman Act and Monopolizing the
Broadcasting Opportunities by a Professional Sport League
Immunity from section one of the Sherman Act for professional
sport leagues when pooling broadcasting rights would not affect liabil-
ity under section two.279 Section one and section two are separate
violations. 280 The SBA itself was only meant to address liability under
section one of the Sherman Act. Even the four major professional
sport leagues, exempt from section one under the SBA, have always
been liable for violations of section two.281
When analyzing television contracts under the monopoly provision
of the Sherman Act, the concern is generally about the impact the
contract has on competing leagues. 282 This is a different concern than
the SBA's exemption from section one. The SBA concerned competi-
tion among teams, not leagues. 283
It can be argued that a professional sport league's television broad-
casting contract in an oversaturated television market creates a high
barrier of entry for competing leagues. Today's television landscape is
broader than it has ever been. More networks and broadcasting op-
tions are available than ever before.284 Moreover, professional sport
277. Id. at 1188.
278. See Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd., No. 97-5184, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9896, at *10-11 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 1998), affd, 172 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1999).
279. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 788 (1946).
280. Id.
281. Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
282. See USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988), affg 634 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
283. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
284. The Museum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 233.
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leagues have found these other avenues of broadcasting, such as pay-
per-view, satellite, and team-owned networks, conducive to their
needs. 285
There will always be a limited number of programming hours on a
limited number of television networks and the more leagues can
charge broadcasters, the less networks will be able to pay other com-
peting leagues for their products. Unlike over-the-air channels, con-
sumers pay a basic fee for such programming. Thus, the more that
networks spend on sports programming, the more the consumers must
pay.2 86 In today's atmosphere of media conglomerates, television con-
tracts are offered as multi-network deals.287 For example, ABC and
ESPN have the same parent company and television contracts with
either could involve both networks. 288 These types of contracts can be
analyzed for violations of section two. 289 This would not interfere
with a professional sport league horizontally pooling broadcasting
rights.290
A professional sport league has a difficult time surviving without
striking a competitive broadcasting television deal with a highly visible
network.291 For example, in September 2003, the WUSA 292 closed
down, in part, due to the loss of television viewership after moving to
Pax-TV. 293 Yet, there is judicial indifference to the need for a televi-
sion-broadcasting contract and to the monopolistic nature of the
sports world.294 In USFL, the United States Court of Appeals for the
285. The NHL offers games to consumers through local broadcasts, national broadcasts on
ABC and ESPN, and season packages on satellite television and digital cable. See NHL, Home
Page, at http://www.nhl.com (last visited Mar. 11, 2005).
286. Cable fees depend on the number of subscribers the cable system has and what each
basic cable network charges the cable company. See The Museum of Broadcast Communica-
tions, supra note 233. A typical basic network costs about three to twenty-five cents per month
for each subscriber. See id. More popular cable networks, such as ESPN, can charge more than
less popular cable networks, such as Nostalgia Television. See id.
287. Both Fox and ESPN have television broadcasting rights contracts with MLB, and the
NFL has deals with ABC, Fox, CBS, and ESPN. Recent Television Rights Deals, STREET &
SMITH'S SPORTsBUSINESS J.: BY THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29, 2003, at 84.
288. See ESPN, supra note 10.
289. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
290. The broadcasting contract as a whole should be analyzed, and not the pooling of broad-
casting rights among the teams that forms only one party of the contract.
291. For example, compare the $4.6 billion the NBA will receive for its 2003-2004 season
from ABC to the $40 million, plus production costs, paid by MLS to have its games broadcast on
ABC, ESPN, and ESPN2. See Broadcast Rights to Major Sports Properties, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTsBUSINESS J.: BY THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec. 29, 2003, at 84. In addition, MLS is responsi-
ble for all sales of advertisements. Id.
292. The WUSA was founded in 2000 and played its inaugural game in 2001. See Melissa
Sedlak, WUSA Timeline, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESS J., Sept. 22-28, 2003, at 4.
293. Lee, supra note 178, at 4.
294. USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1998).
1270 [Vol. 54:1237
2005] THE SPORTS BROADCASTING ACT OF 1961
Second Circuit laughably affirmed damages of one dollar (trebled to a
whopping three dollars) to the USFL because the NFL was found to
be a monopoly. 295 But the court refused to find that the monopoly
power the NFL enjoyed interfered with the USFL's ability to get a
television broadcasting contract of its own.296 The judiciary assumed
that leagues with television contracts received them because of their
superior business practices. 297
IV. IMPACT
Congress should grant all professional sport leagues equitable im-
munity from section one of the Sherman Act when those leagues de-
cide to horizontally pool broadcasting rights into a national package.
Expanded immunity would impact competition for television con-
tracts among all professional sport leagues, clarify how federal anti-
trust law handles television contracts and professional sport leagues,
expand opportunities for professional sport leagues to explore other
broadcasting mediums besides air channels, and possibly influence
views on how collegiate athletics should be televised.
A. Promotion of Competition and Clarity
By leveling the playing field for the pooling of broadcasting rights
among professional sport leagues, all leagues can strike business deals
with broadcasters without fear of antitrust liability under section one
of the Sherman Act. They will be free to decide whether pooling
broadcasting rights is a pertinent course of action for their particular
league.298 Leagues will be able to better compete against each other
and produce more opportunities for consumers to enjoy their events.
For example, some professional sport leagues, such as MLS and the
Women's National Basketball Association2 99 (WNBA), have tried to
circumvent section one liability completely by structuring themselves
as single entities. 300 Recently, the single-entity structured sport league
295. Id. at 1380.
296. Id. at 1341.
297. Id. at 1361.
298. A league such as the NFL could decide that it is in its best interests to control all broad-
casting rights during the regular season and playoffs while a different league, such as the NBA,
could decide to allow its teams some control over local broadcasts while offering national games
on over-the-air and cable networks.
299. It is unclear whether the WNBA is included within the meaning of "any league of clubs
participating in professional ... basketball ... contests." Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15
U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). Arguably, the plain language of the statute would include professional
basketball played by either men or women.
300. A single-entity structured sport league is one in which all of the teams, player contracts,
and coaching contracts are owned by the league itself. Fraser v. MLS, L.L.C., 97 F. Supp. 2d 130,
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has become difficult to operate and maintain.30 1 With newer profes-
sional sport leagues, such as the WNBA and MLS, moving towards
the more traditional structure, they have opened themselves up to lia-
bility for their broadcasting contracts. An expansion of the SBA to
include newer professional leagues would prevent future legal
problems for these leagues and promote competition among the vari-
ous leagues.
Expansion would also produce a clearer application of section one
to professional sport leagues. It would be easier to apply an exemp-
tion to all professional sport leagues pooling their teams' broadcasting
rights. Antitrust analysis can be complex, especially when it may not
apply depending on which professional sport league is in front of the
court and on whether the network broadcasting the league's games is
over-the-air or not.
B. Consumer's Choice
Unlike other natural monopolies, such as utility companies, sports
and sports broadcasting is a luxury, not a necessity, although some
fans would argue otherwise. Ultimately, the consumers choose
whether to watch for free or pay to watch. With the explosion of
broadcasting mediums since the enactment of the SBA in 1961, such
as cable television and packaged satellite television, consumers have
more choice than ever.3°2 Yet, consumers' choices are limited by the
unequal playing field among professional sport leagues and the ability
to pool broadcasting rights. Evening the playing field among the
leagues should produce greater consumer choice.
C. Future Mediums
An expansion of the SBA to include all professional sport leagues
and modern forms of television broadcasting would only allow federal
antitrust law to catch up to the most popular forms of broadcasting
131-32 (2000), rev'd, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002). The traditional structure of sport leagues,
including the MLB, NBA, NFL, and NHL, consists of teams independently owned and operated.
Id. Because a single-entity structure sport league would be considered a single economic actor,
section one of the Sherman Act would not apply to its internal business operations such as
selling national broadcasting packages to its games. See Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473
F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1972); Six Twenty-Nine Prods., Inc. v. Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d
478, 484 (5th Cir. 1966).
301. The WNBA decided to restructure its league to include independently owned teams. See
Sarah Talaly, WNBA Takes on New Look, SUN-SENTINEL, May 4, 2003, at IOC. In 2002, MLS's
structure was scrutinized by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. See Fraser,
284 F.3d at 47.
302. See Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association, supra note 111.
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available today. But if antitrust issues are so outdated and compli-
cated now, what will happen when technology revolutionizes the
broadcasting of sports yet again? When the SBA was enacted in 1961,
the proliferation of cable and satellite television involved a futuristic
imagination.30 3 A simple, equitable rule will help deal with emerging
broadcasting antitrust issues, such as the NFL's new league-owned
networks. 304 Professional sport leagues would be free to explore any
television broadcasting opportunity that could arise in the future, even
if that allows individual teams to broadcast locally through team-
owned networks.30 5
In addition, technology, such as "internet broadcasting" and wire-
less communication devices, such as cellular phones, has grown tre-
mendously in the past few years.30 6 In December 1999, there were
approximately 2.8 million broadband subscribers in the United
States.30 7 By June 2002, the number had risen to 16.2 million broad-
band subscribers. 30 8 Today, professional sport leagues offer consum-
ers the option to listen to free radio broadcasts of games.309 The next
step in internet broadcasting will likely be live streaming video broad-
casts of games.310 Along with internet broadcasting, wireless capabil-
ity is now more advanced. 311 Currently, cellular phones are capable of
surfing the Internet, receiving live information such as game scores,
and even allowing consumers to listen to live audio from sporting
events.312 Immunizing all professional sport leagues from section one
303. The first cable network, Home Box Office (HBO), was founded in 1972. See The Mu-
seum of Broadcast Communications, supra note 233.
304. In 2003, the NFL launched its own network dedicated to the NFL and football. See NFL,
About NFL Network, at http://www.nfl.comlnflnetwork/faq (last visited Mar. 11, 2005). The
NFL Network is available to basic subscribers of DirecTV and other cable companies. Id.
305. For example, the New York Yankees and other New York teams broadcast their games
on their own local network. See YES Network, supra note 213.
306. Many professional sport leagues offer live radio and video broadcasts of their games over
the Internet. See, e.g., NHL, NHL Radio, at http://nhl.comlintheslotllisten/radio/index.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2005).
307. Broadband Growth, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTSBUSINESS J.: BY THE NUMBERS 2004, Dec.
29, 2003, at 84.
308. Id.
309. For example, the NHL allows the public to listen to the official local radio broadcasts of
each team for free. NHL, supra note 306.
310. Current technology makes live streaming video a viable option for sport leagues. See
Stephan M. Astor, Comment, Merging Lanes on the Information Superhighway: Why the Con-
vergence of Television and the Internet May Revive Decency Standards, 29 Sw. U. L. REV. 327,
345-46 (2000).
311. See John D. Penn, Mobile Computing: Wireless Computer Networks' Convenience and
(In)Security, 21-5 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28 (2002).
312. Nextel Communications, a cellular phone company, offers its customers the options of
receiving "daily news updates, driver stats, live race leaderboards, qualification and race results,
standings, and schedules" and listening "to drivers and their crew members talking pit strategy,
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liability for pooled television broadcasting rights will modernize the
SBA to today's broadcasting issues and give insight on how leagues
should control "broadcasts" in a technology-driven world.
D. Collegiate Athletics
Currently in collegiate athletics, the NCAA is barred from pooling
broadcasting rights for regular season events under Board of Re-
gents.313 The NCAA only controls the television broadcasting rights
of some championship events. 314 If all professional sport leagues
gained an equitable immunity from section one of the Sherman Act, it
would provide a steppingstone for collegiate athletics to pursue simi-
lar immunity and be able to gain the competitive balance it lost after
the Board of Regents decision.
V. CONCLUSION
Expanding the federal antitrust immunity of the SBA is necessary.
Expansion would promote competition for all television broadcasting
rights deals, not merely "sponsored telecasts,"315 among all profes-
sional sport leagues, and it would provide an equal playing field for all
professional sport leagues. An equal playing field provides smaller
and newer professional sport leagues the opportunity to horizontally
pool television broadcasting rights without having to worry about sec-
tion one antitrust liability.
The unique business nature of sports provides legitimate business
justifications, such as competitive balance, for granting equal protec-
tion from section one to all professional sport leagues that wish to
horizontally pool individual teams' rights into any television broad-
casting package, including packages for cable and satellite television.
Expanding the limited section one immunity for pooling broadcast-
ing rights does not mean professional sport leagues will be completely
immune from federal antitrust liability. Section one could still be ap-
plied to the actual contracts between professional sport leagues and
conditions, handling and timing, live during each NASCAR Nextel Cup Series race." See
Nextel, Experience NASCAR on Your Nextel Phone, at http://www.nextel.com/phones-plans/
nextelcup/wirelesscontent.shtml (last visited Mar. 11, 2005). The impact of wireless technology
on the sports industry can he shown by NASCAR's deal with Nextel. Id.
313. See supra notes 142-147.
314. See id.; NCAA, supra note 224. The revenue from broadcasting championship events is
extremely important to the NCAA. See KNIGHT FOUND. COMM'N ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATH-
LETICS, supra note 222, at 19. For example, the NCAA has an eleven-year, $6.2 billion contract
with CBS for the Division I men's basketball tournament. Id. Broadcasting rights, such as the
CBS deal, account for nearly eighty percent of the NCAA's revenue. Id.
315. Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
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broadcast networks for vertical restraints on trade. Also, section two
of the Sherman Act would still be present as a source of liability for
professional sport leagues. Leagues can still be held liable for mono-
polizing or attempting to monopolize television broadcasting
opportunities.
If an equitable immunity is granted, then perhaps in the future, in-
stead of coming home to a Monday Night Football game after a long
day's work, millions of Americans could be enjoying pizza and throw-
ing popcorn at their television sets while watching Monday Night Soc-
cer or Monday Night Softball.
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